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THE TYRANNY OF BEST INTERESTS:
STERILIZATION AND THE RETARDED ADULT

By Kathleen S. Skullney

"To be a child is to be at risk. dependent, and without
capacity or authority to decide what is 'best' for oneself. To
be an adult is to be a risktaker, independent, and with
capacity and authority to decide and to do what is 'best' for
oneself. "1

The Dilemma
retarded adult is both child and adult. yet neither. It
is a penumbral status, unique because the usual
coincidence of mental and physical maturity fails. Such an
adult cannot progress away from the concerns and interests
of a child toward those of an adult. Rather, mental and
emotional development for the retarded individual ceases at
some point prior to reaching physical maturity. Although it
is a gross simplification of a far more complex combination,
such an individual displays somewhat adolescent-like attributes and needs of both child and adult. Unlike the
adolescent, however, the duality is permanent. Thus the
societal and political interests of this member of the community cannot be viewed exclusively from either perspective. 2
Professor Joseph Goldstein notes that one of the basic
elements of adulthood absent in childhood is "capacity." It
has been defined as the "mental ability to make a rational
decision, which includes the ability to perceive, [and] appreciate all relevant facts."3 Capacity, in fact, may be the most
important distinction between child and adult regarding full
participation in the greater community.4 Capacity is what
gives effect to choice. Choice as personal autonomy is an
obvious and fundamental element of a free society. 5 The
degree to which an individual is free, then, depends on
capacity. "[W]e recognize a right to autonomy only for
persons within a certain range, a range defined by the ability
to make rational choices about how one's self ought to be
expressed, realized, and fulfilled."6
Furthermore, there is a direct relationship between autonomy and the realm in which it is exercised. The existence
of strong consensus in favor of autonomy within a given
realm signals a category of rights which should enjoy a
presumption against exercise or intrusion by another. It is
intuitively and nearly universally recognized that a person's

A

physical body, and the uses to which it is put make such a
realm .7
Included in this protected realm of bodily autonomy are
certain activities that arise naturally with coincidental physical and mental maturation. One of the most fitndamental is
human reproduction. s It is in this category of very private,
subjective activities that the dilemma of the retarded adult is
most acute. Physical maturity gives her or him the reproductive rights that society recognizes, but incapacity makes
choices regarding them impossible. Hence, a retarded adult
is denied any exercise of those rights. If the choice can only
be made by the holder of the right, does the right have any
meaning for a holder who is incapable of choosing? Can it
be given any meaning by a surrogate chooser? If so, the real
dilemma for the at risk. dependent, and vulnerable adult is the
nature of that surrogate.
Historically, no dilemma existed because society had not
formally examined procreation as an individual right. During 'the first half of the twentieth century ignorance and
arrogance led state legislatures and the courts to authorize.
non-consensual sterilization of the mentally impaired. Eugenics, as a science and philosophy was the justification, The
Supreme Court affirmed the concept of eugenics in the 1927
case of Buck v. Bell when it upheld a Virginia sterilization
law. It was perhaps best articulated by Justice Holmes'
majority opinion that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough.''9 Despite the fact that eugenics lost most of its
scientific validity throughout the following decade, more
than half the states retained sterilization laws. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, procreative ability was again considered by the
Supreme Court in 1942 and found to be a "basic liberty"
requiring strict judicial scrutiny if denied. I 0
Even under Skinner, however, there would have been no
dilemma for the retarded ad uIt. It wasn't unti I the "p ri vacy"
doctrine was developed that choice as a concomitant right of
procreation emerged. The right of privacy was found to be
protected by various amendments in the Bill of Rights and
was first applied to procreational decisions between husband
and wife in Griswold v. Connecticut. I I
The right of
procreation and the special relationship of husband and wife
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combined to focus constitutional protection on the
procreational decision itself. The same privacy protection
was found applicable to individual procreation decisions in
Eisenstadt v. Baird. 12 "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."13
Any doubts about personal autonomy over reproductive
decisions that may have lingered after Eisenstadt were
dispelled by Roe v. Wade. 14 The Supreme Court found the
right of privacy "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to tern1inate her pregnancy."15 In
later cases, the Court found reproductive autonomy so
fundamental that decisional privacy protected abortion choice
from spousal interference, from parental interference with
the decisions of "mature" minors, and protected the sale of
contraceptives to minors.16 Clearly, autonomous rights
associated with human reproduction cuts across relationship
lines, and just as clearly they are not restricted to adults. In
all cases, however, such rights arise in a context of physical
maturity and capacity. Thus, the dilenm1a of the retarded
adult in regards to her or his own procreative abilities is
brought sharply into focus.
The Legal Response
Within what one commentator calls the "context of
reforn1", legal response to issues involving the reproductive
rights of mentally impaired persons has changed dramatically since the days of Bell. 17 The history of sterilization
abuse in general and against the retarded in particular, the significant increase in scientific and societal understanding of mental impainnents, and
the powerful doctrine of procreational
privacy have evoked a strong protectionist stance in most courts and a number of state legislatures. 18 The same
refonn efforts have resulted in attempts
to "normalize" retarded individuals so
they may exercise their rights as fully as
possible and develop skills to live as
independently as possible. 19 A survey
of case law reveals that the two types of
reforn1 are not necessarily in concert.
Much of the current law is the result of cases that arose
in the early 1980's. Typically they were, and continue to be,
brought in the fonn of a petition for sterilization by the
caretaking parents of a retarded (never competent) daughter. 20 The two most widely followed cases on the general
issue of sterilization ofthe mentally impaired can1e about this
way.21 Courts claim jurisdiction either by statutory authority
or by the parens patriae authority of an equity court to
protect those who cannot protect themselves. 22 Some courts

are bound to decisions based on specific statutory or judicial
criteria or a general statutory ban on non-consensual sterilization. In the absence of such requirements, equity courts
have attempted to compensate for the incompetent's lack of
capacity to decide by applying either oftwo tests to petitions
for sterilization. 23
The most common is the "best interests" inquiry that
"directs judges to consider and weigh designated criteria in
determining whether sterilization is in the incompetent person's
best interest."24 The detennination itself remains within
judicial discretion. Such valuation is intended to remove
subjectivity and arbitrariness from the issue. 25 Many courts
attempt to reinforce the objectivity of the test criteria by
disallowing consideration of any third party or outside
interests. 26 Furthern10re, parents are required to make a
threshold showing that they have petitioned in "good faith. "27
The alternative test, less frequently used in sterilization
cases, is one of substituted judgment. This inquiry requires
the court to "decide vicariously what the ward would do ifthe
ward were competent. "28 "The courts thus must endeavor,
as accurately as possible, to detennine the wants and needs
of this ward as they relate to the procedure ... "29 This is to be
accomplished through the doctrine of substituted judgment.
The factors considered include objective and subjective
evidence from experts, interested parties, and the retarded
person herself. "In utilizing the doctrine the court does not
decide what is necessarily the best decision .. .ifan individual
would, if competent, make an unwise or foolish decision, the
judge must respect that decision. "30 Theoretically, at least,
the court could make an "unwise or foolish" decision on
behalf of the retarded person. 31 Since no
court would admit to such a result, judicially considered factors ultimately bear
a strong resemblance to "best interests"
despite the contrary theoretical basis.
Virtually all courts require a threshold finding of incompetence which may
include separate consideration of any
ability to comprehend various aspects of
reproduction and child bearing.32 Likewise, courts rigidly require that the standard of clear, strong, and convincing
evidence be met by the proponents of
sterilization. 33
Despite the assertion made by every
court that an incompetent person has the constitutional right
to choose not to conceive a child,34 she is almost never
allowed by the court, under either test, to "choose" the
sterilization option. "This heavy burden ofproof imposed on
the petitioner underscores ... that the court must take great
care to ensure that the incompetent's rights are jealously
guarded. "35 The Hayes court conceded that "in the rare case
sterilization may indeed be in the best interests ofthe retarded
person ... ," but took the position that granting a sterilization

Virtually all courts
requlre a
threshold
finding of
incompetence .
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Every court, sooner or later in its opinion, cites the abuses of
petition was an invasion of her privacy right. 36
Much of the criticism of this lopsided view of privacy the past as justification for its stringent review. "We must
centers on basic flaws in both tests. The "best interests" test always be mindful of the atrocities that people of our own
with its stringent "objective" criteria begs the question by century and culture have committed upon their fellow huovervaluing the right of reproduction. Pure substituted mans. "42 "Sterilization has a sordid past in this country judgment, when applied to someone who has never been especially from the viewpoint of the mentally retarded. "43
competent, is simply a logical contradiction. The court must "This record of past abuses necessitates governmental pro"discern the competent values and preferences of a never- tection of a mentally retarded person's rights."44 While
competent person. "37
freeing the retarded from abusive governmental and societal
In reality, the two tests combine into one. The court intrusion, such a heavy historical burden on the sterilization
determines what it interprets to be in the best interests of the issue has imposed equally intrusive governmental protecincompetent young woman (generally to preserve the right of tions. In effect, one set of limitations simply replaced
another. "Any governmentally sanctioned (or ordered)
reproduction) and then "substitutes" its determination for
hers. "Where an incompetent person lacks the mental procedure to sterilize a person who is incapable of giving
capacity to make that choice, a court should ensure the consent must be denominated for what it is, that is, the state's
exercise of that right on behalfof the incompetent in a manner intrusion into the determination of whether or not a person
that reflects his or her best interests. "38 Thus, any discussion who makes no choice shall be allowed to procreate." 45
The second failure is a more important one because it has
of "best interests" includes both tests.
a more significant effect. The use of objective criteria by
The Legal Requirements
which a third party attempts to simulate the most personal
The Grady court declared that it is the court, not the and subjective of decisions seems to miss what the Constituparents which must "determine the need for sterilization." tion actually protects. Skinner recognized the individual
Relying heavily on Hayes, it then set forth three requirements fundamental right to procreate and Eisenstadt implicitly
for doing so. First, a guardian ad litem must be appointed for recognized its reciprocal, the right not to procreate. What
the incompetent person. Second, the court must find by clear Eisenstadt explicitly recognized, as had Griswold before it,
and convincing evidence that the incompetent person lacks was the profoundly private nature of "the decision whether
present and future decisional capacity. The court empha- to bear or beget a child" and the impropriety ofgovernmental
sized the testimony of experts and any possible testimony intrusion. 46 "[W]hether one person's body shall be the
from the incompetent person herself. Third, the "court must source of another life must be left to that person and that
be persuaded by clear and convincing proof that sterilization person alone. "47 In other words, the right of reproductive
is in the incompetent person's best interests. "39 At least nine privacy consists of two equally protected alternatives. The
factors must be considered in deternlining those interests: means of affording equal protection is the personal decision,
l)pregnancy potential; 2)potential adverse effects of preg- signalling which of the alternatives has the least value to the
nancy; 3)sexual activity potential; 4)present and future rightholder. The Constitution protects not just a decision
comprehension of reproduction issues; 5)present and future between the two alternatives, but a personal decision becontraception alternatives; 6)immediacy of need; 7)present tween the two.
The fault we find [is] first concluding ... that
and future parenting abilities; 8)possible technological adthe right to sterilization is a personal choice,
vances; 9)the good faith of the petitioners. 4o Some courts add
but then equating a decision made by others
medical necessity to the list. 41 Most courts use all or some
with the choice of the person to be sterilized.
combination of the Grady factors.
It clearly is not a personal choice, and no
amount of legal legerdemain can make it
The Effects
SO.48
Criticisms levelled at this painstakingly scrupulous apThe problems inherent in court self-assignment of such a
proach come from two perspectives. One focuses on how it
effects the privacy rights of the incompetent individual and decision are evident. The issue is one of choice, yet the
the other focuses on its effects in a separate, but closely individual for whom the choice is being made has had no say
related realm of privacy, that of the family. Both aspects in who will make it. Her possible, but inarticulable prefercoincide at a point that has significant importance for re- ences, in the matter have not been explored. Since the court
tarded adults who continue to live with their families.
is one of equity guided by conscience, she is then subjected
to the basic value system of the deciding judge. Inevitably,
"[the] 'best interests' argument is a nile requiring that...a
I. The Individual
Viewed from an individual perspective, the Grady- Judge should invoke his or her own moral, philosophical,
Hayes approach fails in two ways. First, it fails to implement theological and sociological precepts in deciding whether the
the true goals of the reforms of which it claims to be a part. operation should take place."49
The adult needs of the retarded person are never considered.
23.31U. Bait. L.F. - 15

A further problem is deciding how to make the choice.
One reproduction alternative is inevitably pitted against the
other, resulting in the one with the least error potential being
inevitably favored. The "error" in choosing sterilization had
been considered its irreversibility, 50 making it presumptively
less favored. Without going any further, the judicial decision
is already suspect. If procreation begins as the objectively
favored choice, no genuine effort is made to assess the
possible subjective value of non-procreation to the incompetent person (or in the alternative the non-value of procreation.) Professor Scott suggests that a person who has no
comprehension of reproductive, child bearing and child
rearing processes has no protected interest in them. Therefore, "the decisionrnaker should not exaggerate the retarded
person's interest in procreation when determining whether
sterilization is appropriate."51 Because of sterilization's
historical burden, courts have frequently viewed suggested
benefits of sterilization as accruing to the proponents of the
procedure rather than the retarded person herself.5 2
This highlights a problem with the Grady criteria, and
probably with any objective, rationally defensive criteria as
well. The conscious isolation of more subjective considerations such as normalization goals and possible "lifestyle"
needs tends to force these concerns into an adversarial
position with the more objective
concerns expressed in the criteria.
This seems to be especially true
when subjective benefits are suggested by parents or other nontechnical parties. "[I]n the question of sterilization the interests of
the parents of a retarded person
cannot be presumed to be identical
with those of the child."53 Granting that, it does not necessarily
follow that the interests of parent
and child are mutually exclusive
and a shared benefit is therefore
immediately suspect. Furthermore,
factors like those outlined in Grady
do not, and cannot, represent the
fu 11 range of reasons competent women employ when making
reproductive choices. A recent newspaper report that discusses a new procedure for controlling or eliminating menstruation and causing infertility cites "convenience" as the
single reason given by at least 10% of the women seeking it.
Other women, a marathon runner for instance, cited the
demands of their lifestyles. 54 The exclusion of such considerations by the courts effectively discriminates against incompetent women who may have greater interests in sterility
than in procreation.
A further effect of decisions by self-assigned judges
exists. While the possibility of irreversible sterilization error
weighs heavily on the courts, the legal ramifications of
continued fertility "error" are almost never considered. 55

The Supreme Court has come close to this issue only once.
In Stump v. Sparkman, the Court upheld the judicial" immunity of an Indiana judge who had ordered the sterilization of
a marginally retarded young woman. 56 She was not informed
ofthe nature of the procedure and found out only later after
she married and attempted to have a child. This case is often
cited in support of judicial over-protectiveness, but that
misses a greater point. No matter which way the court errs,
the incompetent person has no remedy because the person
who erred is immune. A woman who is denied sterilization
may be significantly harmed by a subsequent pregnancy. It
is a sobering irony that her parents would then have to
petition the court again to obtain an abortion. Had her
parents or any other third party denied her sterilization, she
may have a cause of action against them. When a judge
denies it, she has none. 57
Another significant equality interest that may be obscured by an artificially narrow emphasis on the procreative
right is that of opportunity. "American society, while
valuing freedom, also values equality - especially equality of
opportunity. "58 Freedom of opportunity in both employment
and social interaction may depend on the degree of supervision required, which in turn may depend on how vulnerable
the individual is to pregnancy. Extremely vulnerable women,
unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence that such a social need is
determinative, may have such opportunities foreclosed by supervision requirements. "Sterilization is, then,
actually a means of maximizing the
freedom of the mentally incompetent. "59 "[S]terilization ... could well
facilitate the entry of these persons
key
into a more nearly normal relationship
with society."6O The unwarranted
burdening of the sterilization option
clearly raises freedom of association
issues. 61

By refusing to
consider the
family context,
the court denies itself
the best
to
who she is and
what her values
might be.
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2. The Family
The right to enjoy intimate relationships is the right that brings the individual retarded
person into the second important aspect of privacy and is the
aspect from which the objective "best interests" test receives
its severest criticism. This aspect is the family and its
importance to an adult who also remains a child.
Professor Tribe notes that "the family unit does not
simply co-exist with our constitutional system but is an
integral part of it, for our political system is superimposed on
and presupposes a social system of family units, not just
isolated individuals. "62 The family has been characterized as
a necessary limitation on governmental power. "[T]he
structure of formal family life emphasizes that sense of
'ordered liberty' necessary to achieve individual liberty as a

long-range objective."63 The importance offamily has long
been recognized by the Supreme Court, which afforded it
privacy protection years before affording Constitutional
protection to human reproduction. 64
Such importance has resulted in favored legal status. The
legal presumption that the family operates in the best interests of its members pervades other areas of family law,
sometimes to the significant harm of a member. Case law is
replete with the victims of abuse and neglect on whose behalf
the state was reluctant to interfere with family relationships.65 The absence of "best interests" consideration in
certain parental actions is also remarkable. Judges are not
"required" to review the consent for adoption ofa child given
by a natural parent, yet that decision has life-altering consequences for the adoptee. The Supreme Court upheld the
presumption against a challenge to state laws that allowed
the commitment of children to mental institutions by parents
without a reviewable procedure. "[W]e conclude ... that the
traditional presumption that the parents act in the best
interests of their child should apply."66 It is difficult to
understand the singularly rigorous scrutiny of the sterilization issue.
Greater than the presumption that the family is not acting
in her interest, however, is the effect of not viewing the
incompetent person from her position within her family. By
refusing to consider the family context, the court denies itself
the best key to who she is and what her values might be.
"Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community
of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life."67
Many commentators interpret the Constitutional protection of the family as including the family relationships
themselves, and that any significant governmental intrusion
disrupts and may potentially destroy those relationships.
[I]t is naive to suppose that the state's
interests in guaranteeing individual liberty,
and a family unit's commitments to each
other through shared goals and obligations,
are mutually reinforcing. That is why we
deceive ourselves if we think that we can
temporarily emancipate children from their
parents and families, and then return them
without consequence, as though no intrusion into the family bond had occurred, as
though no violation of the family's commitments had happened. 68
Children, and incompetents remaining with their families,
have a liberty interest in the care, stability, and protection
they receive from their families. This interest depends on the
preservation of mutual family relationships and that mutuality includes having decisions made by their families on their
behalf. "Constitutional liberties protect children in the

exercise of choices that their parents have made for them. "69
By removing not only the sterilization decision from the
family, but any ability to affect its outcome, the court
seriously tramples on an important liberty interest of the
retarded person.
Conclusion
It would appear that the courts cannot accomplish their
protective purpose by the method they have chosen without
a high costto the individual being protected and to her famil y.
The problem is relatively simple. An exclusive individual
right to choose among reproductive alternatives cannot be
exercised by the retarded person. Yet it is desirable that a
choice be made. The question then becomes who is in the next
best position to choose for the individual? The courts have
arrogantly answered that they are and have attempted to
reach the most intimate of decisions by means of rigorously
imposed objective criteria. The result is the exaggeration of
a single alternative amid a glaring lack of intimacy.
A better answer is a decision made by those who can come
closest to matching the intimacy and subjectivity that would
characterize a decision made by the individual herself. "We
share our selves with those with whom we are intimate and
are aware that they do the same with us. "70 "Friendship,
love, and family represent institutions in which intimacy is
central to the relationships. ''7)
The difficulty is specifying who has an
interest that is in fact allied without first
deciding what is good for the child (or
incompetent person)-the very point at issue. One possibility is to look for an adult
who might automatically suffer if the wrong
decision is made for the child. Clearly that
person has an incentive to determine the
child's real interest and assure that it is
advocated. Parents may typify this kind of
representative, because as long as they live
with the child, and often thereafter, they
bear the consequences of the child's misfortune or unhappiness.72
The courts do not. 73
The courts could adequately fulfill their protective role,
however, by a threshold determination of the level of competency of the impaired individual and the good faith of the
individual's surrogate. Historical abuse notwithstanding,
they should intrude no further. "[T]he imbedding of a choice
within a close human relationship ... should always be regarded as significantly increasing the burden ofjustification
for those who would make the choice illegal or visit it with
some deprivation. "74
The answer to the simple question of who should decide
the undecidable cannot help but reflect a fundanlental view
of the relationship between the individual and the government. "[I]t is a profoundly paternalistic and pessimistic
notion that political functionaries should be presumed better
23.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 17

able to make private healthcare decisions than the family. "75
To have such decisions made by any branch of government
is a particular kind ofcreeping totalitarianism, "76 a tyranny
of best interests.
U
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